If a neurologist attends to a patient who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease at an advanced stage of evil in which occurs this process that we call dementizacion and which patient, to be interrogated about his name, no longer can respond, you could say that the experience that the neurologist is taking is the observed a cognitive system that is losing its own and specific features of a personal system. It is obvious that in two cases set forth I am not referring to the condition of human person that child and that patient from the legal point of view or to their rights as such. What I want to point out, in particular, is that I take it to the person as a result of a constructive process that occurs through socialization, i.e. live of an individual of the species homo sapiens sapiens from its birth in the dynamics of interaction in the language. As pointed out by George Herbert Mead (1934), the person has a character different from the Agency itself, since it is not present from birth but that arises and builds in the process of experience and social activities. I believe sufficient evidence that provide numerous cases, from Victor of Aveyron until our days, of individuals of the species which, having been bred in the wild (outside of a context of language) by animals, did not reach the status of a personal cognitive System. (Montanari, 1978;) Maturana & Varela, 1984; Cole & Cole. 1989, Balbi & Bergamasco, 1990). Let’s look at another example: if I see an individual who suffers from a mental disability, for example, a Down’s syndrome, and may not be literate and in the encounter with him tells me that he is happy because tomorrow is his birthday and tells me carrying that name because so his grandfather was called, I’ll be totally convinced that I am having the experience of observing a personal cognitive organization.